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INVESTMENT SECURITIES
By
THOMAS H. JOLLS*
Williamsburg, Virginia

Fictitious Person as a Registered Holder of Stock
Probably the most significant and the most interesting case to be
reported is Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. ,v. Walston & Co., 21
N.Y. 2d 219, 234 N.E. 2d 230, 287 N.Y.S. 2d 58~ (1967). The case
was reargued and affirmed under the same title at 22 N.Y. 2d 672,
291 N.Y.S. 2d 366 (1968).
This was not a decision under the Code, as the events took place
before its effective date in New York. In attempting, however, to come
to grips with what seems to be a case of first impression, ·both the
majority and the nlinority in this 4-to-3 decision did not hesitate to
range over statutory materials characterized by varying types of inapplicability: Article 8 of the Code (not yet law); Article 3 of the
Code (pot yet law, and if it were, inapplicable per section 3-103);
the Negotiable Instruments Law (applicable only to instruments payable in money; restrictive fictitious payee provision therein expanded
in scope by the Code in section 3-405).
The only statutes clearly applicable were the New York Personal
Property Law sections corresponding to the ,Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, which does not in terms deal with the "fictitious person" problem-as the court saw it, the heart of the case.
Brokerage firm A was the holder and owner of stock certificates
of three companies, duly indorsed in blank by prior owners, which
it desired to have transferred to its own riame, either for its own account
or for the account of customers. One of A's clerks, M, whose duty it
was to prepare transfer instructions and forward certificates to the appropriate transfer agents, inserted in the instructions the name "Jack
Arbetell" as the transferee, instead of the name of A as he was supposed to do. Apparently this transmittal went forward in the routine
of the hundreds or thousands of such transactions which a large brokerage firm would be handling daily; the shares were transferred per instructions; when the new certificates came back from the transfer agents,
the clerk, M, who was apparently in a position to do so, simply took
possession of the certificates. An accomplice of M then presented him~
self to Brokerage firm B seeking to sell the securities; B's employee or
employees accepted the somewhat scanty identification of "Jack Arbe*Member of the Illinois Bar; Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, the College of William and Mary; Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investment Securities. This survey was prepared with the assistance of Subcommittee members Richard E. Deer, Richard B. Dewey, John P. Eastham, William W.
Fisher and Bruce Alan Mann.
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tell," opened an account, guaranteed the signatures, and paid over the
proceeds of $76,000. "Arbetell" was a non-existent person, at least
if one is willing, as the majority of the court was, to take M's word for
this vital fact. The fraud having been discovered, A's assignee, its insurer, now sues B for conversion.
The majority of the court, centering its attention on §168 of the
New York Personal Property Law (§7, Uniform Stock Transfer Act),
under which the true owner can reclaim a stock certificate and rescind
the transfer unless it has been transferred to a purchaser for value in
good faith, concluded that Broker B was guilty of conversion as against
A, and must pay A the value of the stock. The court found that under
the applicable New York law the test of good faith of the selling broker
(B) was at least as strict as that expressed in Code section 8-318,
which provides that in the case of a selling broker good faith includes
"observance of reasonable commercial standards,"- and it held that
Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange "formulates what are 'reasonable commercial standards' in this context by requiring the broker
to use d~Ie diligence to learn the essential facts relative to its customers."
However, the final decision in favor-of A must be considered as based
on §162 of the New York Personal Property Law-i.e., there was no
proper indorsement of the certificates.
The dissenting opinion favors B on the ground that the accomplice's
signature on the certificates constituted the indorsement "by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby," which was required by § 162 of the New York Personal
Property Law ( § 1, Uniform Stock Transfer Act) in order to transfer
title. Application of the fictitious payee doctrine is the key element in
this rationale, and its application was apparently thought justified in
part by the fact that the larceny began when the original certificates
(bearing proper indorsements in blank by the actual owners thereof,
and therefore "negotiable") were sent to the transfer agents for reissuance in the name of the fictitious person.
It is difficult to ~ccept the majority's portrayal of A as one who has
suffered a wrong. One looks in vain for a finding that A had some
duty to someone in this case. A delegated to its clerks, and placed
within the scope of their employment, the matter of giving issuance instructions to tran~fer agents (an accepted commercial practice). A's
employee committed fraud on his employer, and on his employer's
customers (not to say the issuers and transfer agents). B's employee
was at most negligent.
Whether or not the "fictitious payee" analogy is accepted, should
not the case have been decided on the basis of an estoppel against A,
to reach a just result, contrasting A's employee's fraud with B's employee's negligence?
A number of problems may well arise out of this case to which the
majority opinion will not provi~e satisfactory answers. If this case had
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come up under the Code, an analysis based on the application of several
Code provisions would have been in order here, space permitting.
Perhaps the conclusion should be that an amendment to Article 8
is needed, to incorporate the substance of section 3-405, to put the risk
of the "fictitious ownership situation on the presentor for transfernot on issuers, signature guarantors, or subsequent intermediaries and
purchasers. It is at the point of registration of transfer that the damage
is done, and at that point the means of prevention lies solely with the
presentor."
D~livery to a Purchaser

In The Berkeley, Inc. v. Brettler, 234 N.E. 2d 742 (Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct. 1968), the court held valid a gift of corporate stock, where the
stock certificate belonging to and issued in the name of M was in
possession of the corporation's attorney, and M signed and delivered
to him a stock power in blank, intending thereby a gift to her husband,
A, of the shares represented by the certificate. The inference was that
the' attorney was acting on behalf of A who was hospitalized. The attorney later filled in the stub in the corporation's transfer book to show
A as having become the shareholder, although a new certificate was not
in fact issued.
The court referred to two Massachusetts cases indicating that delivery of a stock power alone would not make an effective transfer,
but pointed out that in the present case there was a settled donative
intention together with an actual or symbolic delivery of the subject
matter in such manner as completely to transfer the dominion and
control of it. Section 8-313 was cited, wherein it states "(1) Delivery
to a purchaser occurs when (a) he or a person designated by him
acquires possession of a security." While the Code definition of "delivery" as "voluntary transfer of possession" [section 1-201(14)] was
not mentioned, the holding seems consistent therewith. Reference was
made to the inclusion of a donee in the definition of "purchaser" in
section 1-201(32). It was pointed out that to require the attorney to
hand M's certificate to her, so that she could hand it back to him, would
have involved a futile and unnecessary act.
Statute of Frauds
Cohn, Ivers & Co. v. Gross, 56 Misc. 2d 491, 289 N.Y.S. 2d 301
(App. Term 1968), involved a "call" on stock. The plaintiff was a "put
and call" broker who, as found by the court below, orally purchased
from an individual (the defendant), for a premium, a call on 100 shares
of X Corporation stock at a specified price. Such a "call" is in the
nature of an option giving the optionee (plaintiff) the right to claim
the subject matter upon payment of the agreed price by a specified
date.
In finding for the plaintiff, the court held that this oral contract
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was not governed by section 8-319 relating to the sale of securities,
because the call was not a "security" as defined in section 8-102. It
can also be pointed out that securities as so defined are "negotiable instruments" (section 8-105) and there is no document of this character
arising out of the acts of the parties. Rather, we are looking at a simple
contract falling within the "catch-all" statute of frauds section 1-206,
as pointed out by the court. This section exempts from the requirement
of a writing a contract, such as this was, involving not more than $5,000
(either as to the price paid for the call, or the value of the stock deliverable upon exercise).
Lindsey v. Stein Brothers and Boyce, Inc., 433 S.W. 2d 669 (Tenn.
Sup. Ct. 1968), raises the question of the applicability of the statute
of frauds (section 8-319) to a brokerage transaction. The plaintiff
claimed that in a telephone conversation he directed his broker to sell
100 shares of X stock at 85; two days later the stock reached that price
and nothing was done; after plaintiff's further inquiry imd further
lapse of time, the stock was sold at 64. Upon a suit against the broker
to recover the difference between $6,400 and $8,500, the lower court
held that the statute of frauds was a good defense and that the plaintiff's
bill of complaint was insufficient in law.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant being one of principal
and agent rather than buyer and seller, the statute of frauds did not
apply. The court relied on Stott v. Greegos, 95 N.J. Sup. 96, 230 A.2d
154 (1967), directly in point and discussed in last year's survey. 1 It
was there suggested that Official Comment 2 to section 8-319 should
be clarified and, in effect, purged of references to strictly brokerage
transactions. Such action might avoid the necessity of re-litigating this
same question in still other jurisdictions.
Possible Violation of Securities Act of 1933 as a Bar to Tr{lnsfer
In Shearson, Hammill and Co., Inc. v. Yankee Plastics, Inc., 5
U.C.C. Rep. 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968) it was held, consistently with, section 8-401 of the Code, that there was no restrictive
legend on stock certificates (section 8-204) the issuer was obligated
to make transfer, and could not advance an unsupported claim that a
"' "no-action" letter from the SEC should be presented. However, in
Travis lnv. Co. v. Harwyn Publishing Corp., 288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968), where the presenter was a broker seeking transfer into
his own name for the purpose of sale, the court held that under the
common law of New York (the Code not yet being effective at the
time of the transaction) the issuer was justified in withholding transfer
where the New York Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange
Commission had served written notice on the transfer agent that "con1. JoJis, Investment Securities, 23 Bus. Law. 849 (1968).
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trol" stock of the issuer was likely to be presented for transfer in connection with sales in violation of the Securities Act of 1933. Quaere,
under the C0de whether there would be a duty to register transfer (section 8-401); whether the Securities and Exchange Commission is an
"adverse claimant" (section 8-301); whether the issuer's duty of inquiry could be discharged by notice to the Commission per section
8-403 coupled with a failure on its part to take injunctive action; or
whether such informal notification does not, of itself, place the issuer
under a duty to inquire and thus negate the statutory obligation to
register transfer.

